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There have been attempts to subsume Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution under either one of two
distinct intellectual traditions: early Victorian natural science and its descendants in political economy
(as exemplified by Herschel, Lyell, or Malthus) and the romantic approach to art and science emanating
from Germany (as exemplified by Humboldt and Goethe). In this paper, it will be shown how these
traditions may have jointly contributed to the design of Darwin’s theory. The hypothesis is that their
encounter created a particular tension in the conception of his theory which first opened up its char-
acteristic field and mode of explanation. On the one hand, the domain of the explanandum was
conceived of under a holistic and aesthetic view of nature that, in its combination with refined tech-
niques of observation, was deeply indebted to Humboldt in particular. On the other hand, Darwin
fashioned explanations for natural phenomena, so conceived, in order to identify their proper causes in a
Herschelian spirit. The particular interaction between these two traditions in Darwin, it is concluded,
paved the way for a transfer of the idea of causal laws to animate nature while salvaging the romantic
idea of a complex, teleological and harmonious order of nature.
 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences1. Introduction
History and philosophy of science has seen an equally impas-
sioned and unresolved debate as towhich of two distinct intellectual
traditions Charles Darwin and his theory of evolution ultimately
belong. One side mobilises the broad and ready-to-hand evidence
that shows the commitment of Darwin’s theory to the standards of
modern natural science and its ideals of exact, predictive knowledge,
which became canonised in early 19th century Britain by the phi-
losophers of science JohnHerschel,WilliamWhewell and JohnStuart
Mill,1 andwhich also informed political economics of theMalthusian
stripe. Against this majority view, other historians set out to
demonstrate Darwin’s deep sympathy for a wave of ideas crossingu.at.
hilosophers, see Hull (1973,the Channel from Germany that emerged in critical reaction to
modern science: the romantic approach to arts and science, para-
digmatically embodied in the literary and scientific achievements of
Johann Wolfgang Goethe and Alexander von Humboldt.
In this essay, which is intended as a historically informed
endeavour in the philosophy of science, I will argue that a strict
disjunction between the above interpretations of Darwin’s place in
the history of ideas is inappropriate, and that both traditions played
a formative role in Darwin’s theorising. These traditions and their
specific styles of reasoning may not merely have cohabited as the
proverbial Goethian two souls dwelling in one breast, nor have they
been adopted by Darwin in sequential order, with the romantic
being discarded in favour of the modern scientific view, nor were
they a mere conjunction of a romantically informed literary style
and a more traditional approach to scientific explanation. Instead,
my hypothesis is that that their encounter created a particular, and
productive, tension in the conception of Darwin’s theorywhich first
opened up its characteristic field and mode of explanation.
2 In his argument against Richards, Ruse neatly divides scientific and philo-
sophical positions along geographic and political boundaries, where romanticism is
considered a specifically Germanic state of mind, and where modern science is the
profession of the sober Englishman. Ghiselin (2015) adopts a similar position, with
the addition of seeking a non-British key influence on Darwin in French rationalism
rather than German romanticism. Such stereotyped arguments ad patriammight be
particularly difficult to apply to the scholarly realities of Darwin’s day though.
German, British, French and other scientists and natural historians were aware of
each others’ works, not least because the fields were small enough to allow each
individual to know a significant portion of what his colleagues on the other side of
the Channel (or the Rhine) did and thought. Agreement and dissent between them
did not neatly divide along geographical boundaries either. One does not have to
look further than Humboldt to find examples of a matter-of-course scientific
cosmopolitanism in the early to mid 19th Century (a phenomenon that, however,
was to face much harder times in the 20th Century).
H. Greif / Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 53 (2015) 53e6154The argument is of a dialectic kind: romantic science, with its
foundations in idealistic Naturphilosophie and mostly in its Hum-
boldtian incarnation, provided Darwin with a particular language
and theory of observation, while the Victorian science of his day
delivered to him the theoretical models on which to base his
explanation. The very synthesis of what first appears disjunct is an
image of nature that bears many of the characteristics of the
romantic viewwhile beingmade amenable to an explanation in the
terms and in the spirit of the more mechanistically inclined natural
sciences of Darwin’s compatriots.
I will first provide a brief outline of the competing, pro- and
anti-romantic interpretations of Darwin’s theory (Section 2), before
moving to an account of the influence on Darwin exerted by the key
figure in science to emanate from (and ultimately transcend)
German romanticism: Alexander von Humboldt (Section 3). This
source of influence will then be matched against the other tradition
to which Darwin was indebted, the Victorian variety of modern
science (Section 4). The synthesis of these influences will be the
topic of the concluding Section (5).
2. Contested influences
In the last chapter of his The Romantic Conception of Life, titled
“Darwin’s Romantic Biology”, Robert J. Richards (2002) seeks to put
Darwin and his theory into a carefully adjusted romantic light. He
argues that Darwin was not only a great admirer of Humboldt and
his worksdwhom he portraits as one of the standard-bearers of
German romanticismdbut that Darwin’s observations of nature
were also marked by an aesthetic sensitivity that was typical for
that movement. This aesthetic approach was based on a conception
of nature that, too, conformed to the romantic view. More precisely,
both Darwin’s and the romantics’ conception of nature, on
Richards’ reading, was that of a fundamental unity of mind and
nature. By implication, nature appears as inherently purposeful and
dynamic in character, where, firstly, creative force permeates all
matter, animate and inanimate, and where, secondly, the devel-
opment of nature is considered progressive in direction, andwhere,
thirdly, any living being’s morphology adheres to archetypal pat-
terns. Moreover, Richards claims that Darwin believed in a genuine
moral significance of nature that was at odds with the then-
dominant utilitarian views. The romantic view of the world, on
Richards’ reading, is comprised of precisely the three elements he
identified in Darwin: a specifically holistic metaphysical conception
of nature, an aesthetics based on the immersion in nature, and an
ascription of normative qualities to nature.
In a spirit similar to Richards’ (2002) but within the framework
of textual analysis, David Kohn (1996) makes an elaborate case for
the central importance of two romantic metaphors in Darwin’s
theorising, the tension between them, and their synthesis in his
Origin of Species: the “wedging” metaphor (1859, p. 67), with its
connotations of force and upheaval, representing the sublime
character of natural phenomena, and the “entangled bank” meta-
phor (1859, p. 489), with its connotations of peace and tranquillity,
standing for the beauty of natural phenomena. It is a common
romantic endeavour to juxtapose and possibly reconcile the sub-
lime and the beautiful aspects of nature in one coherent, integrated
aestheticdand this is what Kohn sees embodied in the Origin.
In The Meaning of Evolution (1992), Richards delivers a detailed
historical and more matter-of-factual account of the influence on
Darwin’s evolutionary theorising exerted by the transcendental
morphology of Goethe and some of his contemporaries via Richard
Owen, and their views of embryonic development. In fact, the latter
kind of process had been the referent of the term of “evolution”
before Darwin repurposed it for an application to the phenomenon
of species change. This twofold meaning of the term evolution,Richards argues, is neither an instance of arbitrary terminological
choices nor a matter of coincidental analogies but testifies to the
development of Darwin’s theory from those morphological roots
(and hence, using one of the biological terms at issue here as a
metaphor, a homology between them).
We can now identify two levels of romantic influence on Darwin
that have been argued for: firstly, there is the claim of concrete (but
sometimes implicit) references to theories and theorists belonging
to the romantic tradition; secondly, a less tangible relatedness in
spirit to the metaphysical, aesthetic and normative underpinnings
of romantic science and its conceptions of nature is claimed, where
the realness of that relationdin terms of shared reference to an
identical set of ideas rather than coincidental similarities between
themdis somewhat more difficult to demonstrate. These two
levels of influence, although natural companions and genealogi-
cally related, are note entailed by each other. One could adopt the
theories in question for circumscribed explanatory purposes
without actually buying into the metaphysics and aesthetics in
which they were embedded as well as one could embrace the
aesthetics and some of the metaphysics of nature without caring
much about the scientific pretentions that travel with them. The
strongest case for a romantic influence on Darwin will be the one
that confirms it on both levels.
Michael Ruse is an outspoken advocate of the received, nature-
red-in-tooth-and-claw view of Darwin’s theory, as becomes
particularly clear from his (1999) book The Darwinian Revolution. In
his review (2004) of Richards’ above-mentioned last chapter, he
would not accept either level of romantic influence. Although he
does not deny that supposedly romantic thinkers, above all Hum-
boldt, had an influence on Darwin, he locates all decisive factors in
the formation and elaboration of his theory within the British
tradition in which Darwin grew up. At most, the views to be found
in the romantic sources are not too dissimilar from the ones he
encountered closer to home, which, as Ruse claims, were the ones
he actually referred todfor example the notion of homology, the
above-mentioned ideas in embryology, the belief in the progres-
siveness of evolution, and the deistic God-as-nature rather than the
traditional Christian theistic spiritual undercurrent.2 Above all,
however, Ruse argues that there is no way in which the central
Darwinian tenet of natural selection could be made to fit into a
thoroughly romanticised picture of Darwin. Without postulating
that causal mechanism, his theory would not be an explanatory
theory; with that mechanism included in the picture, there are key
components in Darwin’s theory that escape the romantic view,
which hence is unable to capture the essence of his theory qua
theory.
Natural selection as a mechanistically conceived causal force
that gives rise to intricate design in nature is a leitmotif not only in
Ruse’s rendering of Darwin’s theory but also in the mainstream of
evolutionary thinking after Darwin, mostly in what has been
3 See Hull (1973, p. 5) and Ruse (1975, p. 164) vs. Depew & Weber (1995, p. 59).
But see Sloan (2003, pp. 23e25), for a more balanced perspective.
4 For example, mostly in the third volume of Kosmos (1845), Humboldt frequently
refers to Herschel’s astronomical work (rather than his philosophy of science).
Herschel in turn honoured Humboldt’s Kosmos and the conception of science
embodied therein with an in-depth philosophical critique in the Edinburgh Review
in 1848 (reprinted in Herschel, 1857).
5 Richards (2002, p. 516) notes that, whereas not all Naturphilosophie is to be
subsumed under the romantic tradition, all romantic science adheres to the tenets
of Naturphilosophie. Heidelberger (1998), on he other hand, draws a fairly direct line
of influence from Naturphilosophie to the romantics. The bottom line is that
romantic thinkers, to the extent they concerned themselves with science, were
followers of Naturphilosophie.
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interpretation in two ways. Firstly, Ruse’s (and presumably many
other Neo-Darwinists’) view of Darwin’s theory in general and
natural selection in particular is deemed ahistorical. It reads
contemporary interpretations of evolutionary processes into Dar-
win’s thinking, as if natural selection were an immovable, timeless
concept rather than an idea conceived by real people and subject to
the transformative but often capricious powers of biography and
history. Secondly, Richards accepts that Darwin considered natural
selection as a crucial force in evolutionary processes but insists that
it was not conceived as a mechanism by Darwin. On Richards’
interpretation, it was a manifestation of the very creative forces
that are the hallmark of romantic thinking about nature.
There is a possibility that neither Richards nor Ruse appear to
properly consider in their controversydwhich will continue in
their co-authored book Debating Darwin (Richards & Ruse, in press).
The possibility is that a strict disjunction between Darwin the
romantic and Darwin the modern scientist is not entirely appro-
priate. Conceding that Darwin was a man of many influences, as
both authors do (Richards, 2004, p. 34; Ruse, 2004, p. 9), does not
go deep enough either, as they do not proceed to asking what the
specific role of those other influences may have been but hasten to
continue their respective exclusively romantic vs. mechanistic
narratives instead. However, the conceptual gap between romantic
and modern science was not quite as unbridgeable as it might look
to the present observer, where the mechanistic view has firmly
consolidated its dominant role, and where romantic notions have
become difficult to perceive as scientific at all. It might just be that
Darwin was a thinker who tried to bridge this gap in an innovative
way.
Attempts at more balanced perspectives on the influences that
worked on Darwin and his theory include, for example, the one
proposed by Benjamin Bradley (2011), who traces the origins of
Darwin’s notion of the sublime back to (British) literary roman-
ticismdand ultimately to Kantdwhere the sublime is understood
as a sentiment of awe in the face of the experience of one’s limit-
edness as a human being, as compared with the vastness,
complexity and apparent perfection of nature. The argument has an
epistemological twist: acknowledging the richness and complexity
of nature has to be separated from any presumed understanding of
how it came about. Concerning the task of gaining a true under-
standing, Darwin resorts to his and other naturalists’ experimental
practice. Phillip Sloan (2003) provides evidence for a diversity of
intellectual roots when he recounts Darwin’s formative years and
the personal, educational and literary influences during that time.
All of these influences were catalysed by the encounters with na-
ture and people during the Beagle voyage into a first theoretical
synthesis within a few months after his return, in which his notion
of evolution is already manifest. In an earlier essay, Sloan (2001)
traces the influences of various religiously informed but scientifi-
cally relevant conceptions of naturedtheistic, deistic, and
romantic-pantheisticdthat Darwin endorsed throughout his life,
which seem to be at odds with each other but were integrated by
Darwin into one theoretical edifice. It is in the line of these inte-
grative perspectives on Darwin’s theorising in which I see what
follows, adding a slightly different take that focuses on Darwin’s
style and methods of inquiry.
3. Humboldtian and romantic science
A good indicator why it might be useful to adopt an integrative
perspective on the formation of Darwin’s theory is the observation
that, when recounting in his Autobiography which books contrib-
uted most to his career choice as a naturalist, Darwin mentions
Humboldt’s Personal Narrative (1818) in close conjunction with SirJohn Herschel’s Introduction to the Study of Natural Philosophy
(1830)da work that is in some important respects at variance with
Humboldt’s approach to science and its romantic underpinnings:
During my last year at Cambridge, I read with care and profound
interest Humboldt’s ‘Personal Narrative.’ This work, and Sir J.
Herschel’s ‘Introduction to the Study of Natural Philosophy,’
stirred up in me a burning zeal to add even the most humble
contribution to the noble structure of Natural Science. No one or
a dozen other books influencedme nearly so much as these two.
(Darwin, 1905, vol. I, p. 47)
Intriguingly, some Darwin scholars, when commenting on this
passage, tend to ignore either its reference to Humboldt or to
Herschel.3 One may argue that doing so amounts to selective
blindness. Alternatively, one may assume that the tradition in
which Humboldt stood was not that different from the Herschelian
one in the first place. In fact, the disjunction between these tradi-
tions is not as strict as the polemics around Darwin-the-romantic
vs. Darwin-the-modern-scientist would suggestdwhile remain-
ing systematically relevant. After all, their disagreements occurred
within one and the same scientific-philosophical discourse.4 It is
this field of tension in which Darwin navigated, steering between
different perceptions of the nature of the naturalistic inquiry and
between different perceptions of what constitutes the natural
order.
3.1. Humboldtian views
To a certain extent, Alexander von Humboldt’s mode of inquiry
into nature may look like the paradigm of the romantic subtype of
Naturphilosophie, and it is thus characterised by Richards (2002).
Naturphilosophie was a direct albeit in some respects heretical
descendant of German idealism, and its tenets informed romantic
science throughout.5 On Richards’, and similarly on Michael Hei-
delberger’s reconstruction (1998), the basic tenet of Natur-
philosophie was that the intuitive self-awareness of the mind
provided for a faculty that, although not in a flatly material sense,
gave rise to a world of natural phenomena as objects of the mind’s
experience. Accordingly, the apparent design to be found in nature
is a feature of the mind reflected in all nature. In experiencing
outward nature, the mind would encounter its own naturedin a
fundamental relation of likeness between them. Despite the wide
variety of interpretations that could be, and have been, given to this
doctrine by various proponents of Naturphilosophie, the common
goal was to tear down, in someway or another, the barrier between
mind and nature that, on their view, had been imposed by idealism.
Doubts have been raised by some historians of science as to
whether “Humboldtian science” really or completely fits into the
category of Naturphilosophie and, by implication, romantic science.
On one set of views, Humboldtian science was hardly connected to
the romantic tradition at all: Timothy Lenoir (1982), for example,
argues that Humboldt has been brought up and was working in a
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late 18th and early 19th century German biologists adhered to the
doctrines of Naturphilosophie, while the majority, including Hum-
boldt, adopted positions that only bore “superficial similarity” to
those doctrines, while actually standing in traditions discontinuous
with, and critical of, Naturphilosophie (p. 6). He cites as proof the
majority’s upbringing as students of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach
(who coined the term “Bildungstrieb”), a Kantian whom he claims
to have had little inclination towards Naturphilosophie (for an
alternative interpretation of these relations, see Richards, 2002, pp.
216e229). Alternatively, it has been argued that, even if having part
of its roots in romanticism and Naturphilosophie, Humboldt’s style
of conducting science was marked by a particular method of
empirical investigation that cannot be found in the romantic
approach to nature. According to Susan Faye Cannon (1978, ch. 3),
in her account of what she termed “Humboldtian Science”, this
particular style even gave rise to a distinctive paradigm of scientific
research, whose influence reached far beyond romantic circles (a
similar disjunction is made by Lorraine Daston, 2010).
In fact, Humboldt distanced himself from those strands of
Naturphilosophie that merely indulged in metaphysical specula-
tions about nature unconnected to any systematic mode of expe-
riencing it.6 However, this critique does not amount to an outright
dismissal. Sloan (2001) notes that there are two distinct traditions
of Naturphilosophie, the more idealistically inclined, more specu-
lative and more systematic Schellingian and the pantheistic, more
aesthetically mindeddand ultimately more romanticdGoethean
one.7 Humboldt adopted and further developed the latter of these
traditions, and bequeathed his version of it to Darwin. Michael
Dettelbach (1999, 2001) argues for a fundamental continuity be-
tween conceptions of empirical science in enlightenment and
romanticism, in their respective Humboldtian interpretations,
where exact measurement and aesthetic sensibility go hand in
hand.
On the background of these latter observations it can be argued
that, inasmuch as Humboldt’s style of scientific inquiry indeed
differed from his romantic contemporaries, the difference lies in
how it complemented their Naturphilosophical tenets and their
aesthetical approach to nature with empirical methods rather than
in repudiating them. After all, some of the paramount norms of
romantic science can be found impressively embodied in Hum-
boldt’s multi-volume Relation historique du Voyage aux Régions
équinoxiales du Nouveau Continent (1814) and Kosmos (1845), both
based on his travels as a naturalist to the Americas: an organicist,
holistic concept of nature and a genuinely aesthetic approach to its
investigation. On the basis of these norms, he crafted a mode of
description of natural phenomena that aims at a comprehensive,
both truthful and aesthetically compelling, image of nature, and as
such equally belongs to the domains of the arts and of science. The
complementarity in question can be found on two interrelated
levels, concerning methodological and ontological aspects.
The first complementarity lies in Humboldt’s suggestion that
intuition should be sharpened and improved by a systematically
guided experience of nature, and in his proposal of a practical mode
of methodically generating such experience. He understood mea-
surement as an extension and refinement of one’s senses as a living
being, thus being very much in line with the aesthetic approach to
nature characteristic of romanticism, not, vs. Cannon (1978), alien6 He explicitly does so in Humboldt (1845, vol. I, p. 68 f)dwhile endorsing
Schelling’s views of nature in the same chapter (p. 39).
7 The complicated and changing relationship between Humboldt and the
Schellingian variety of Naturphilosophie, from early appreciation to later rejection, is
reconstructed by Dettelbach (2001).to it (see Dettelbach, 1999). Hence, the aesthetic apprehension of
nature is the starting point, and it is supposed to be the aim of the
naturalist’s endeavour, but it is not its only means. For example,
Humboldt (1818, vol. I, p. v) states that “It would be injurious to the
advancement of the sciences to attempt rising to general ideas, in
neglecting the knowledge of particular facts”, while “The ties which
unite these phenomena, the relations which exist between such
varied forms of organized beings, are discovered only when we
have acquired the habit of viewing the Globe as a great whole”
(Humboldt, 1818, vol. I, p. 230). A more systematic account of how
to go about appreciating nature is to be found in an exposition of
the “Stufen des Naturgenusses” (“gradations of the enjoyment of
nature”) in Humboldt (1845, vol. I, pp. 6 f, 15e22): from the pri-
mordial, instinctive awareness of a unity of nature entertained by
the primitives, and via the crude, prejudice-laden and dogmatic
empiricism of pre-scientific world-views that first tried to order
and systematise natural phenomena, one arrives at the recognition
of nature’s inner being that scientific inquiry affords. Nature and
her charms are best appreciated when subsuming a manifold of
observational facts from a manifold regions under a unifying view,
so as to intellectually grasp the intrinsic connections between
them.
Secondly, and consequently, Humboldt’s endeavour started
from the Naturphilosophical assumption of an intrinsically lawful,
all-encompassing order of nature that manifests itself in manifold
local phenomena. In the face of the complexity of phenomena,
empirical regularities in terms of patterns of distribution of quali-
ties and their intensities were sought. Those empirical regularities,
being called “laws” by Humboldt, were to be identified in twoways,
on two mutually supporting levels:
1. in the systematic, precise, instrument-based, quantitative
measurements of natural phenomena in the field, followed by
their successive statistical documentation and the spatial and
temporal mapping of distributions of properties;
2. in comprehensive representations of nature (“Naturgemälde”)
guided by aesthetic intuition, under which the properties
detected in nature were arranged in such a way as to enable
apprehension, through all the details, of its structuring features.
These practices were designed to detect common, but not directly
perceivable features behind variable individual instances. Concrete
examples of laws in the Humboldtian sense are to be found in “das
physische Gesetz in der Vertheilung der Continental-Massen”, that
is, the physical law of the distribution of continental masses
(Humboldt, 1845, vol. I, p. 29), or in Kepler’s law of planetary mo-
tion, as distinguished from the Newtonian forces that demonstrate
the theoretical necessity of the regularity to be detected therein
(Humboldt, 1845, vol. III, p. 26 f). The “law of embryonic resem-
blance” referred to in Darwin (1859, p. 439) would also have to be
subsumed under this kind of laws.
3.2. Darwin’s Humboldt
An obvious way in which Darwin followed Humboldt was the
mode of empirical inquiry heralded by the latter. Above and beyond
Darwin’s own claims, it is widely agreed that Humboldt’s Personal
Narrative, the English translation of Humboldt (1814), made amajor
contribution to his intellectual upbringingdeven providing him
with themotive for his Beagle voyage.8 In Darwin’s travel Journal, all8 See Himmelfarb (1959, pp. 46 f, 70); Egerton (1970); Cannon (1978, pp. 86e92);
Desmond & Moore (1991, pp. 91, 115 f, 119); Depew & Weber (1995, p. 59); Sloan
(2003).
13 Darwin concludes a rather detailed report on the distribution patterns of
different species of ostriches and of the Tinochorus family of birds in Argentina
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elaborate on his own observations against the background of
Humboldt’s descriptions of, and ways of inquiry into, natural phe-
nomena. Down to the observational techniques, and down to the
mode and style of description, and even down to partly visiting the
same places as Humboldt, Darwin followed his ideal of the natu-
ralist’s endeavour.9 Perhaps the most beautiful and instructive
passage in Darwin’s Journal to be cited as evidence is the following:
During this day I was particularly struck with a remark of
Humboldt’s, who often alludes to ‘the thin vapour which,
without changing the transparency of the air, renders its tints
more harmonious, and softens its effects.’ This is an appearance
which I have never observed in the temperate zones. The at-
mosphere, seen through a short space of half or three-quarters
of a mile, was perfectly lucid, but at a greater distance all col-
ours were blended into a most beautiful haze, of a pale French
grey, mingled with a little blue. The condition of the atmosphere
between the morning and about noon, when the effect was
most evident, had undergone little change, excepting in its
dryness. In the interval, the difference between the dew point
and temperature had increased from 7.5 to 17. (Darwin, 1913,
p. 33)
But even when not directly referring to Humboldt, Darwin
emulated his peculiar perspective on nature.10 Firstly, measure-
ments and detailed observation reports were combined with
statements about perceptions that not only emphasised the sub-
jective qualities of the phenomena, but essentially consisted in
invocations of those qualities. Secondly, those uniquely styled re-
ports, aptly for a travel journal, were mostly arranged not in topical
order, but along the spatio-temporal sequences of the travel itin-
erary, thereby constructing multi-faceted images of certain places
of the kind that Humboldt called “physiognomies”. The image of
each subject matter in turn was built up in intermittent steps,
emulating the subjective growth of experience.
In search of comprehensive images of this sort, Darwin’s Journal
combined musings on the wholeness and grandeur of natural
phenomena encountered in some place in the wilderness with
accounts of the difficulties in practically coping with the hardships
of travelling to and from that place.11 It also combined meticulous
observations of animals, plants and climate with, sometimes
normatively laden, descriptions of social and cultural phenomena
encountered in the same region.12 Most significantly, it traced
biogeographical patterns of distribution of plants and animals,
trying to map their presence and absence in different places within
the regions visited onto the climatic, geological and biological9 It did not escape Humboldt’s attention that Darwin’s observations on his Beagle
voyage followed an aesthetic-scientific paradigm similar to his own, whose origin
he in turn locates in Georg Forster’s travels and works; see Humboldt (1845, vol. II,
p. 72) and the letter he wrote to Darwin in September, 1839 (first published and
translated in Barrett & Corcos, 1972).
10 In a similar vein, Egerton (1970) argues that Humboldt’s Personal Narrative
instructed Darwin “how and what to observe and how to write about it”, but this
influence is seen restricted to the general organisation of the text and to the
analysis of animal and human populations.
11 See, for example, Darwin (1913, p. 26): “It is easy to specify the individual
objects of admiration in these grand scenes; but it is not possible to give an
adequate idea of the higher feelings of wonder, astonishment, and devotion, which
fill and elevate the mind.” This introspection is followed by observations about the
adventure of road travel in Brazil.
12 See, for example, Darwin (1913, p. 24), where he, after concluding his obser-
vations on evaporation in rainforests, gives an eyewitness account of the practice of
slavery, expressing his disgust for it; or Darwin (1913), pp. 104e108, where a
painstakingly detailed description of the anatomy of a species of Virgularia is fol-
lowed by a report of the genocidal Argentinean “Indian Wars”, the chapter being
finished with observations about the size and distribution of flintstones.conditions encountered there, testing whether or not they covary
with each other and with the species’ distribution. These complex
observations would become part of the foundations of the Origin,
being recapitulated in the chapters on “Geographical
Distribution”.13
Darwin did not embark on systematic theorising in the Journal.
This should hardly be surprising, since the book was a naturalist’s
travel report, not a scientific treatise. When finally moving to
explanatory theories, despite the significant influence of Humboldt,
Darwin would choose a different path. Again, this should not come
as a surprise, as Humboldt’s writings would not have provided
much in the way of an explanatory theory, but remained an
expressly descriptive endeavour, albeit of a special kind. Humboldt’s
Weltbeschreibung neither was, nor was intended to be, a Welter-
klärung. If and when done properly though, a comprehensive
description would ultimately reveal the purposeful structure of
nature.
Nonetheless, the Humboldtian heritage is still visible in many
passages of theOrigin of Species, although there are nomore explicit
references to Humboldt to be found in this book.14 However, Dar-
win’s literary style alone may already serve as a convincing testi-
mony of this heritage (see Bradley, 2011; Kohn, 1996). After
returning to the geographical distribution of species in southern
South America in the Origin, Darwin makes a remark that, while
strongly echoing the Humboldtian view, indicates the transition
from one conceptual framework to another:
We see in these facts some deep organic bond, prevailing
throughout space and time, over the same areas of land and
water, and independent of their physical conditions. [.] This
bond, on my theory, is inheritance [.] (Darwin, 1859, p. 350)15
This passage reads like a direct rejoinder to Humboldt’s claim “[.]
daß ein gemeinsames, gesetzliches und darum ewiges Band die
ganze lebendige Natur umschlinge” (1845, vol. I, p. 9) or, in the
somewhat truncated English translation, the claim of “one indis-
soluble chain of affinity binding together all nature” (Humboldt,
1849, vol. I, p. 9). Humboldt’s original wording would be more
precisely rendered as “one common, lawful, and hence eternal
bond entwining all nature”. Darwin continues with an explanation
of similarities and dissimilarities between organisms in one region
in terms of common descent and natural selection. The organic
bond between natural beings that remains suspended betweenwith a remark that tempts the contemporary reader to read it as vaguely fore-
shadowing his idea of evolution: “This small family of birds is one of those which,
from its varied relations to other families, although at present offering only diffi-
culties to the systematic naturalist, ultimately may assist in revealing the grand
scheme, common to the present and past ages, on which organised beings have
been created” (Darwin, 1913, p. 98).
14 It is well known that the Origin is marked by the absence of a critical apparatus.
It is also well known that this absence owes to the rush in which the book was
written after evidence of Wallace’s parallel invention of an almost identical theory
of evolution by natural selection emerged. In this light, Humboldt’s absence does
not seem significant. For implicit traces of the Humboldtian ideal of science in
Darwin (1859), see for example his reference to the struggle for life explaining
forms of beauty that exceeds works of art (p. 60 f); his emphasis on the complex,
systemic interdependencies between different organisms (pp. 74 f, 77); his meta-
phorical likening of Nature to a person purposefully caring for each living being (p.
83); his introduction of the tree of life metaphor, likening animate nature to a
complex organism (pp. 128e130); and, of course, the deeply poetic concluding
passage (pp. 485e490). Explicit references to Humboldt can be found in the Essay of
1844 (Darwin, 1909, pp. 71, 166), but, once again, only referring to observations.
15 A very similar formulation is to be found already in Humboldt (1818, vol. IV, p.
217): “Nothing appears isolated; the chemical principles, that were believed to be
peculiar to animals, are found in plants; a common chain links together all organic
nature.”
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Humboldt, in Darwin’s Origin becomes a concrete causal link of
explanatory value within a circumscribed domain of application.
Where nature was comprehended by Humboldt “as a whole,
animated and moved by inward forces” (1849, vol. I, p. [xviii]) or, in
the original wording, “ein durch innere Kräfte bewegtes und
belebtes Ganze” (1845, vol. I, p. vi), Darwin chose to look for real
organic bonds. From the premiss of inquiry, that organic bond is
transformed into its very topic.3.3. The harmony of the natural order
Whatever be the peculiar inherent or temporary character of the
scene contemplateddeven in her most agitated moodsdthis
sense of the regulated and the imperturbable is never wholly
effaced.We know that the stormwill rage itself to rest, the angry
billows subside, the earthquake roll away, and that holy calm
which is her habitual mood be restored, as if it had never been
broken. (Herschel, 1857, p. 268)
In what seems a straightforward inference from the holistic,
teleological and organicist view of nature in romantic science, the
order of nature was also considered harmonious. That harmony
could be read in both descriptive and normative fashion: if an in-
tegrated, goal-directed organisation of nature is presumed, the
normal state of affairs of that organised whole will be marked by an
overall orderliness, equilibrity and stability in the interactions be-
tween its elements. At the same instance, such a state of affairs will
also be considered worthy of aesthetic contemplation and
admiration.
Darwin’s adoption, with modification, of Humboldt’s style,
method and content of inquiry has a parallel in his views on that
apparently harmonious order of nature. The modifications he
applied can be detected in his references to contemporaneous
biological theories, especially those committed to a romantic-
Naturphilosophical view of science, and in his metaphorical char-
acterisations of nature.
Firstly, Darwin in the Origin discusses the claim that all
morphological elements of vertebrate animals are at root meta-
morphosed vertebraeda doctrine shared by the theories of the
vertebrate archetype that were devised simultaneously by Goethe
and Lorenz Oken, and taken over by Richard Owen.16 Darwin ac-
cepts this theory, albeit with a significant modification: the
“metamorphosis” postulated by those theorists should be under-
stood as a historical fact in terms of phylogeny. While, to the former
authors, archetypes were ideal forms of, or idealisations from,
concrete phenomena, Darwin applied a philosophically realistic
interpretation to that theory: to him, the archetype simply was the
ancestor (Darwin, 1859, p. 438 f; Richards, 1992, pp. 105 f, 125).
Secondly, and closely related (spatially and thematically) to the
first issue, Darwin refers to recapitulationist embryology, another
domain strongly influenced by Naturphilosophical thinking
(Darwin, 1859, pp. 439e450): the question whether and in which
way embryonic development recapitulated either an ideal or a
historical, phylogenetical hierarchy of living forms was a central
issue in early 19th century biology. It can be, and has been, argued
that recapitulationism took part in informing Darwin’s theory,16 In this context, Goethe is mentioned twice in the Origin (Darwin, 1859, p. 147),
and in the Historical Sketch that was added in the sixth edition (Darwin, 1872, pp.
xiv, xx).
17 For this argument, see Ospovat (1981, pp. 153e157); Richards (1992, pp. 92, 115
f, 123e129). For a different view, see Gould (1977).where it received, once again, a realistic interpretation: embryonic
development recapitulates phylogenetic history.17
In the morphological and recapitulationist thinking to which
Darwin related it was presupposed that nature, in and by itself, is an
inherently teleologically and harmoniously ordered whole, from
which the phenomena in question could be derived. Ideal arche-
types were believed to preordain the growth and form of individual
organisms and entire species, whereas the archetypes themselves
were not considered in need of explanation. They were the pro-
viders of explanationsdto the extent they figured in an explanatory
endeavour at all. For Darwin, a harmonious order of nature was not
a matter of course anymore. What appears as harmonious in nature
rests on processes that may not bear harmonious characteristics
themselves. The morphologist’s and recapitulationist’s explanatory
solutions were thus transformed into Darwin’s explanatory
problems.
The epistemological problematisation of a harmonious natural
order was complemented with an aesthetic ambiguity and its res-
olution in Darwin’s writings. Kohn (1996) argues that Darwin’s
joyfully romantic descriptions of natural scenes, such as the
concluding paragraph of the Origin, have an underside, affectually
and imaginatively, that, in its very normative connotations,
informed his theory of natural selection. The seeming opposition
between the sublime and the beautiful in nature was resolved by
placing phenomena of a rather sublime quality, namely over-
whelming complexity as well as predation, violence and death, at
the source of the beauty and harmony of the natural scenes that
evoke those feelings of grandeur that Darwin mentions in the
concluding passage of theOrigindthework inwhich Bradley (2011)
sees the culmination of Darwin’s reverence to the sublime.
The transformation of the status of the harmonious order of
nature from an unanalysed general explanatory premiss into a
concrete explanatory problem and the emphasis on an aesthetic
ambiguity between the beautiful and the sublime in nature jointly
figure on the level of Darwin’s systematic theorising, as contrasted
with Humboldt’s views. Although Humboldt was well aware of the
phenomena of population pressure and competition for resources,
and even though he appreciated Thomas Malthus’ famous work on
that issue (1826), Humboldt, unlike Darwin, did not presume these
to be universal phenomena. He considered them deviations from
an ideally harmonious and in principle eternal order of nature (see
his reference to that common, lawful, and hence eternal bond
entwining all nature cited in the preceding subsection). In contrast,
Darwin brought into full view the presence and the effects of
competition for resources, population pressure, and predation on
the distribution of populations over space and time, thus expanding
the scope of Humboldt’s population thinking and placing it in a
different normative light.18 Moreover, despite his fascination with
natural history, it seems that Humboldt held an ambiguous view of
the possibility of historical explanations of natural phenomena, and
that he never openly considered ideas of transmutation of species,
although it is highly probable that he was informed of Darwin’s
theory.19
In Darwin, the very vagaries of competitionwithin and between
populations and the risk of extinction came to figure as the sources
of a harmonious order of nature. Stability and teleological order in
nature became a historical phenomenon in terms of locally and18 This argument for the differential importance given to population pressure and
competition between Humboldt and Malthus, and then Darwin, is made by Egerton
(1970), who also traces the influence of Humboldt’s interest in Malthusian popu-
lation thinking on Darwin.
19 This is what Helmreich (2009) and Werner (2009) argue for in their re-
constructions of the relationship between Humboldt and Darwin.
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were now the topic of investigation.4. The quest for true causes
It is so easy to hide our ignorance under such expressions as the
‘plan of creation’, ‘unity of design,’ &c., and to think that we gave
an explanation when we only restate a fact. (Darwin, 1859, p.
482)
Darwin’s turn away from the presupposition of an inherently
harmonious order of nature and towards causal laws are closely and
systematically connected, inasmuch as causal laws were now sup-
posed to explain that order. Yet before this step is accomplished, a
notion of causal laws that are able to explain the phenomena of the
animate world and the apparent harmony therein has to be
established in the first place. Such a notion did not fall within the
domain of romantic science. This is the systematic point of diver-
gence between Darwin’s adoption of romantic views and his
adherence to the norms of the science of his Victorian compatriots,
a point of divergence that can be traced back to Humboldt’s vs.
Herschel’s interpretations of the laws of nature.
The empirical laws introduced by Humboldt (see Section 3.1
above) are not to be confused with the causal laws envisioned,
first and foremost, by Herschel (1830, 1857). Both Humboldt and
Herschel were aware of this distinction. However, only Herschel
embarked on the project of identifying causes that necessitate the
empirical regularities in question. Humboldt’s abstention from a
causal inquiry neither was a matter of neglect nor of a general
scepticism towards a causal inquiry as such but a sign of episte-
mological caution:
[.] when we cannot hope to penetrate the causes of natural
phenomena, we ought at least to endeavour to discover their
laws, and distinguish, by comparison of numerous facts, what is
constant and uniform from what is variable and accidental.
(Humboldt, 1818, vol. II, p. 214)20
In fact, Humboldt fully acknowledged the importance of causal
explanationsdto the extent to which they are available, sufficient
and appropriate. Yet, firstly, availability of such explanations may
be limited, in terms of information that is missing at the current
stage of inquiry. Secondly, Humboldt considered a causal inquiry
inappropriate to detecting the plan of nature, as such an inquiry can
only be concerned with the properties of matter.21 Moreover, such
an inquiry will aim at analysing limited sets of phenomena rather
than getting the cognitive grasp of the world in its entirety that he
considered the pinnacle of scientific inquiry (Humboldt, 1845, vol.
III, p. 25). Thirdly and conversely, a causal account, if designed to
encompass nature in its entirety, is considered insufficient inas-
much as nature is to be conceived of as “an infinite in extent and
content” (“ihrem Umfange und Inhalte nach, ein Unendliches”,
Humboldt, 1845, vol. I, p. 81). If and when however causal expla-
nations are applied within circumscribed domains and to an
appropriate set of phenomena, they will be a worthwhile
endeavour. Causal explanation, as Humboldt observed, is a process
of abstraction, of carrying over the phenomenal laws into the light20 See also Humboldt (1845, vol. I, pp. 67 f).
21 Intriguingly, this claim about the limitations of the physical sciences was added
to the English via the French edition of the Kosmos by the author and cannot be
found in Humboldt (1845); see the modifications of (Humboldt, 1845, vol. I, p. 31 f)
in Humboldt (1849, p. 32 f) and the editor’s remarks on p. [x]. It is however this very
claim that Herschel quotes, with critical intent, in (1857, p. 272 f).of the conceptual realm (“in das Lichtreich des Gedankens (eines
denkenden Erkennens der Natur) übertragen”, Humboldt, 1845,
vol. III, p. 26 f).
Nonetheless, Humboldt believed that the combination of an
aesthetic and holistic outlook with systematic observation of
empirical patterns by means of comparative measurements will
ultimately provide a deeper insight into the plan of nature than the
refined abstraction of causal explanation could achieve. Some of the
most important relations in nature are not of a causal kind. The
common, lawful, eternal bond entwining all nature is not exhaus-
tively described by identifying causal relations.
Herschel certainly did not have a difficulty with the notion of a
plan of nature as such, but he had an issue with how that plan is to
be revealeddand with Humboldt’s notion of what constitutes that
plan in the first place. Humboldt suggested that even the unin-
structed mind will intuitively grasp the most important relations in
nature. In contrast, Herschel believed that “the hidden powers
which work beneath the surface of things” (1857, p. 271), namely
physical causes, will have to be methodically traced, and that doing
so requires the development of appropriate skills, which, if properly
applied, will allow one to infer the design of nature and the will of
its author. In other words, where Humboldt saw nature’s purpose
revealed in nature’s workings, as he believed nature as such and in
itself to be purposefully organised, Herschel believed, in Newton’s
wake, that one should aim for insight into a higher, divinely created
and externally teleological causal order of nature that is not quite as
directly revealed in the phenomena (Herschel, 1830, p. 43). Nor
could that order be revealed by generalising over phenomena that
have an appearance of being related, however finely crafted the
modes of uncovering and recording the relations between ap-
pearances may be.
Where Humboldt believed that the human mind itself, by its
very nature, would provide for the “combination of impressions
connected with each other by unperceived links of secret analogy”
(as quoted in Herschel, 1857, p. 270), Herschel assumed that sensual
impressions and reasoning by analogy will be of no help or even
misguiding in a world where physical powers hitherto unknown
are connecting kinds of phenomena that are entirely unrelated in
appearance. The quest should thus be for true causes, Herschel’s
famous verae causae, that can be proven to be at work and thus
provide for the genuine relations between such phenomena. Any
science that abstains from a quest for verae causaewould ultimately
remain a superficial affairdeven if as empirically rich and
comprehensive as Humboldt’s.
An implication, if not a corollary of this divergence in inter-
pretation of empirical and causal laws lies in the role and
importance that is given to historical analyses, which becomes
apparent in the disagreement about the historical scope of geology
between Humboldt and another significant influence on Darwin:
Charles Lyell. Lyell’s view of nature is deeply historical, in that he is
concerned with how current geological formations came into ex-
istence, and how they shaped biogeographical patterns. However,
that historical perspective relies on the presumption of a unifor-
mity of causes that, throughout history, have shaped the patterns
in question. Already in the subtitle of Lyell (1835), Principles of
Geology: Being an Inquiry how far the former Changes of the Earth’s
Surface are Referable to Causes now in Operation, his programme is
made explicit: unlike many earlier geologists, Lyell maintained
that the same causes that are now observable have been at work
in building the most ancient formations and strata (Lyell, 1835. p.
xi). It is not only that the causal laws have been the same all along,
they also have been expressed in the same fashion, providing for
processes of gradual transformation rather than abrupt changes.
As already indicated, Humboldt saw too much uncertainty in
historical explanations and thus did not inquire into relations
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with which he was concerned.22 That uncertainty is based on an
uncertainty about causal patterns: unless one assumes that causal
laws are not only universal, in terms of remaining unchanged as
such over different times and places, but also operate in uniform
manner throughout, so that contextual conditions can be sys-
tematically dispensed with, all history will remain confined to
being a narrative of a sequence of, more or less contingent,
events.23
The case for the universality of causal laws relies on the hypo-
thetical assumption of conditions in nature that never really obtain
(e.g., a perfect vacuum). Whenever one systematically removes
interfering contextual conditions, the same patterns will emerge. If
uniformity is granted above and beyond universality, causal laws
will sufficiently explain the currently observable phenomena. On
Humboldt’s view, on the other hand, universality of laws of nature
is compatible with non-uniformity. As indicated in Section 3.1
above, his universal laws are not causal laws in the first place, but
are warranted on a different, metaphysical level and are revealed in
patterns of local phenomena. It is thus perfectly conceivable that
local conditions not only modify the expression of universal laws,
but plainly are their expression. It is this interplay between uni-
versal laws and local conditions, as they are observable and
measurable, that Humboldt was interested in, not the idealisation
and abstraction from local conditions that is a prerequisite for any
causal account and that might get in the way of revealing a number
of crucially important relations in nature.
Although Lyell’s causal account of the history of the earth does
include biogeographical patterns, it does not include the purposeful
organisation of life as such, which is referred to fixed types and a
notion of adaptedness that echo the Aristotelian view of life. In
important respects, life is thereby exempted from Lyell’s causal-
historical account. This, theoretically incoherent, exemption was
based on metaphysical presuppositions that put the living world
out of reach of causal explanations per se (see Depew & Weber,
1995, p. 107). Perhaps ironically, it was Darwin’s thorough adop-
tion of Lyell’s causal uniformitarianism that resulted in an expla-
nation of species change and thus a genuinely historical account of
what had been exempted from the historical realm.5. Synthesis
On the background of the observations in the preceding sec-
tions, the Darwinian tension can be stated as follows: on the one
hand, Darwin adopted a notion of a universal and uniform order of
nature that allows for causal-historical explanations (as Ruse, 2004,
insists), yet without buying into the external teleology that, to
Herschel and Lyell, first warranted that order. On the other hand, he
adopted the Humboldtian and the general romantic view of nature
that emphasises its complexity, integration and goal-directedness,
and he inherited the aesthetically refined techniques of
approaching his subject of investigation (as Richards, 2002, claims
and Ruse denies), yet without taking for granted an internal tele-
ology that first warranted for nature’s purposes (unlike Richards
suggests).22 See, for example, the observation in Egerton (1970) that Humboldt was little
concerned with stratigraphy in geology, but only with contemporaneously
observable phenomena, which Egerton sees as a limitation to Humboldt’s account
of populations.
23 For the relation between the notions of universality and uniformity, see Daston
(2010, especially p. 53) and Depew & Weber (1995, p. 95 f), who contrast the causal
histories of uniformitarian with the narrative histories in catastrophist geology. For
Lyell vs. Humboldt on history and the issue of uniformity of causes, see Hodge
(2009, p. 33).That Darwin kept a distance from either notion of teleology does
not imply that he was the sceptical materialist he is often made out
to be. The uneasy combination of the causal and the romantic views
rather made him a seeker of a synthesis that, in consequence and
possibly unintentionally, undermined the metaphysical pre-
suppositions on either side. Darwin’s synthesis was motivated by a
desire to account both for the specific patterns of the animateworld
and the possible causes underlying those patterns, in a theory that
was causal and historical and holistic at the same instance.
The universal and uniformly operating cause identified by Dar-
win was natural selection working on heritable traits. That cause is
modelled on two sources: firstly, the art of breeding, where a
common practice is to select favoured adult individuals for further
reproduction. This analogy, derived from Darwin’s own breeding
experiments, delivered the basic principle of selection. Secondly, as
the mechanism to realise that principle in nature, Darwin adopted
and adapted Malthus’ putative law that population increase is kept
in check by the limitation of resources. That limitation results in a
struggle for existence between the individuals in that population,
so that those variant individuals within a population that have been
produced in excess of the means of sustenance, and that match the
present conditions of existence to a lesser extent than other in-
dividuals, will not reproduce.24 Inheritance and variance would
also give rise to a second important regularity: a prima facie
coincidental divergence in character, under a given set of condi-
tions of existence, may lead to functional diversificationdwhich, in
turn, was modelled on the Smithian concept of the division of la-
bour in a market economy.25 Natural selection and functional
diversification were supposed to act as external environmental
forces on individuals and populations with the necessity and de-
terminacy of a causal law of nature.
What motivated Darwin’s synthesis between the Humboldtian-
romantic image of nature and causal explanations modelled on a
mechanistic view of nature was an epistemological problem raised
by the empirical practice of the naturalistic inquiries of his day: the
purpose of these inquiries was to identify some of the deeper
regularities in animate nature. In order to do so, they had to rely on
at least some patterns of development that remain unchanged,
lawful, and eternaldwhether they were established by divine
creation or by the dynamic, self-organising properties of nature.
The explananda of those inquiries were the places and in-
terrelations of individuals in the natural order, not the natural order
as such. However, the very same inquiries brought up evidence that
called into question the fixity of what had been considered the
paradigm of natural kinds by many: biological species. Where
variation had been expelled from the realm of scientific explana-
tions as contingent effects and anomalies, it now became the very
object of attention.
In the face of the arising difficulties, the methodically refined
intuitions that were so helpful in perceiving and describing nature
would not offer a viable starting point for its explanation. To Darwin,
a way of overcoming this impasse was to suggest to the naturalist
that his “reason ought to conquer his imagination”, encouraging him
to start from assumptions that actually counter natural intuitions
about design in nature: purposeful structures in nature may arise24 See Malthus (1826). For his references to Malthus, see Darwin (1859, pp. 5, 67);
Darwin (1905, p. 68); Darwin (1909, pp. 7 f, 88 ff).
25 See Smith (1789). The Smithian sources are not nearly as expressly mentioned
by Darwin as the Malthusian ones, as they appear to have worked via indirect
routes. These routes have been carefully reconstructed by Schweber (1980). An
explicit link between divergence of character and the concept of division of labour
is made in Darwin (1859, pp. 93, 112 f). For arguments in favour of an interaction of
Malthusian and Smithian insights in Darwin’s conception of natural selection, see
also Gould (1993, p. 148 ff); Depew & Weber (1995, pp. 7e9, 81 f).
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but may be explained by laws of nature (Darwin, 1859, p. 188). The
“deep organic bond” connecting all forms of life, and the adaptive
complexity they display, were now open to a type of empirical
investigation that did not presuppose those qualities but had a
chance of demonstrating how they came about.
Exactly this is where Darwin’s romantic-Naturphilosophical
paradigm of observation complements his quest for laws of nature.
If animate nature had been explained by laws of necessity in the
same vein as physical phenomena, either the complexity of in-
terrelations and the phenomenal richness of the explanandum
would have been lost in simplification, or the mechanism of
explanation, by overextending its scope, would have been power-
less in accounting for that richness. The initially counterintuitive
point of Darwin’s doctrine is that the struggle for existence, in its
very simplicity, harshness and utter disharmony, explains the
complexity of natural adaptations whose purposeful structures and
whose aesthetic qualities, both in beauty and sublimity, exceed
anything human craftsmanship could achieve. This is where
romantic, Naturphilosophical intuition, moving from likeness to
subtle likeness, detecting patterns of similarity by means of a
perceptual apparatus refined by aesthetic Bildung and observa-
tional technique, could not go by itself.
Just as Darwin’s quest for a causal explanation countered
romantic indifference towards causes, the outlook and the tech-
niques of perception and observation that he inherited from that
tradition provided himwith the sensitivity and the perspective that
were necessary for carefully carving out the domain of the
explanandum in the first place, including its aesthetic and
normative qualities. It was the methodically refined romantic view
that made the history of the animate world amenable to an
explanation that at least, and at last, approximated the standards of
a science that, in spite of its claims for universality and uniformity,
would not dare to embark on a quest for a causal history of the
animate part of nature on its own.
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